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Abstract
This article critically examines the current developments regarding the religious 
terrorism of Boko Haram, an extremist Islamist group, which operates largely in 
the north-east states of Nigeria. Boko Haram’s avowed aim is to wrest control 
from the Nigerian government and to impose a strict form of Sharia law across 
a country of about 170 million people. Since 2009, when Boko Haram first 
launched its Islamic insurgency, over 5 000 Nigerians have lost their lives in 
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bombings and shootings carried out by the group. In addition to a brief discussion 
of the emergence, demands, ideology and external links of Boko Haram, the 
article focuses analytic attention on how the Nigerian state has responded to the 
menacing threat of the group. This is followed by a critical engagement with the 
current debate in Nigeria regarding what can be said for and against negotiating 
with Boko Haram members, and for or against fighting them. In conclusion, 
the article offers some fresh and multifaceted recommendations on how to 
effectively address the Boko Haram impasse.
Introduction
Since July 2009, more than 5 000 people have been killed in bombings and gun 
attacks by Boko Haram, an extremist Islamist group from north-eastern Nigeria 
whose avowed aim is to overthrow the secular government in Nigeria and 
impose an Islamic state governed on the basis of Sharia law (Agbiboa 2013a). 
These violent attacks, which show evidence of increasing coordination and 
sophistication, adds a further complication to the festering security challenges in 
Nigeria by exacerbating existing ethno-religious tensions and inter-communal 
violence in northern Nigeria (Maiangwa et al. 2012). As the crisis escalates, the 
Nigerian state has intensified its efforts to rein in the threat of the group. 
This paper critically examines the current developments regarding the ongoing 
violent campaign of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, including in this instance, 
the reasons behind the group’s rebellion and the ways in which the Nigerian 
state has responded to the crisis since it erupted in 2009. Furthermore, the paper 
critically engages with the ongoing debate in Nigeria regarding what can be 
said for and against negotiating with Boko Haram members, and for or against 
fighting them. 
The rest of the paper is structured into six parts. The first provides a brief review 
of existing literature on religious terrorism in order to glean an understanding 
of the Islamic insurgency of Boko Haram. The second part provides a brief 
background to northern Nigeria and militant Islam, with particular attention to 
the Maitatsine uprisings. The third part explores the terrorism of Boko Haram, 
focusing specifically on the group’s emergence, ideology, demands, and external 
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links. The fourth part attempts to understand why Boko Haram rebels. The fifth 
part critically examines how the Nigerian state has responded to the threat of 
Boko Haram, as well as how these responses have divided Nigerians over the 
Boko Haram issue. Finally, the conclusion offers some recommendations on 
how to effectively address the current impasse. 
Religious terrorism: What does the literature say?
Although terrorism has always formed part of social existence (Rapoport 
1984), it became ‘significant’ for the first time in the 1960s when it ‘increased 
in frequency’ (Sandler et al. 1983:36) and assumed ‘novel dimensions’ as a 
transnational phenomenon (Mickolus 1980: 2), creating in the process what 
Jenkins (1975:1) describes as a ‘new mode of conflict’. Specifically, the link 
between religion and terrorism has a long genealogy in Western scholarship 
(Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000). The idea of a nexus between religion and 
terrorism dates back to David C. Rapoport’s (1984:658–677) seminal paper in 
The American Political Science Review – entitled ‘Fear and Trembling: Terrorism 
in Three Religious Traditions’ – which analyses the use of terror in three religious 
traditions: Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism. As the pioneering comparative 
study of religious terror groups, Rapoport’s paper provides ‘detailed analyses 
of the different doctrines and methods of the three well-known groups: the 
Thugs, Assassins, and Zealots-Sicarii’ (Rapoport 1984:658). Despite a primitive 
technology, Rapoport argues that these groups ‘each developed much more 
durable and destructive organizations than has any modern secular group’ 
(Rapoport 1984:658). Rapoport’s influential paper inspired many similar works, 
primarily in the field of terrorism studies, which sought to explain ‘why violence 
and religion have re-emerged so dramatically at this moment in history and why 
they have so frequently been found in combination’ (Juergensmeyer 2003:121). 
In this particular literature, religious terrorism has been raised above a simple 
label to a set of descriptive characteristics and substantive claims which appear 
to delineate it as a specific ‘type’ of political violence, fundamentally different to 
previous or other forms of terrorism. As argued by Hoffman, this new type of 
terrorism produces ‘radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimation 
and justification, concepts of morality and worldview’ (Hoffman 2006:88), and 
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‘represents a very different and possibly far more lethal threat than that posed by 
more familiar, traditional terrorist adversaries’ (Hoffman 2006:272).
The claim about the specific nature of religious terrorism rests on a number of 
arguments, three of which are discussed here (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Three hypotheses (H) of religious terrorism
Source: Agbiboa2014b:5
First, it is argued that religious terrorists have anti-modern goals of returning 
society to an idealised version of the past and are therefore necessarily anti-
democratic and anti-progressive. Audrey Cronin (2003:38), for example, argues 
that ‘the forces of history seem to be driving international terrorism back to 
a much earlier time, with echoes of the behaviour of ‘sacred’ terrorists ... 
clearly apparent in a terrorist organisation such as Al-Qaeda’. For his part, 
Juergensmeyer (2003:230) contends that religious terrorists work to ‘an anti-
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They have come to hate secular governments with an almost transcendent 
passion ... dreamed of revolutionary changes that would establish a godly 
social order in the rubble of what the citizens of most secular societies 
have regarded as modern, egalitarian democracies .... The logic of this 
kind of militant religiosity has therefore been difficult for many people to 
comprehend. Yet its challenge has been profound, for it has contained a 
fundamental critique of the world’s post-Enlightenment secular culture 
and politics (Juergensmeyer 2003:232).
It is further argued that religious terrorists have objectives that are absolutist, 
inflexible, unrealistic, devoid of political pragmatism and hostile to negotiation 
(Gunning and Jackson 2011). As Matthew Morgan (2004:30–31) notes: ‘Today’s 
terrorists don’t want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the table and 
everyone sitting at it’. Byman (2003:147) says of Al-Qaeda: ‘Because of the scope 
of its grievances, its broader agenda of rectifying humiliation, and a poisoned 
worldview that glorifies jihad as a solution, appeasing Al-Qaeda is difficult in 
theory and impossible in practice’.
A second important argument suggests that religious terrorists employ a 
different kind of violence to secular terrorists. For example, it is argued that for 
the ‘religious terrorist, violence is ... a sacramental act or divine duty executed 
in direct response to some theological demand’ (Hoffman 2006:88), as opposed 
to a tactical means to a political end. Furthermore, it is suggested that because 
religious terrorists have transcendental aims, are engaged in a cosmic war and 
lack an earthly constituency, they are not constrained in their pedagogy of 
violence and take an apocalyptic view of violent confrontation: ‘What makes 
religious violence particularly savage and relentless is that its perpetrators have 
placed such religious images of divine struggle – cosmic war – in the service 
of worldly political battles’ (Juergensmeyer 2003:149–150). For this reason, acts 
of religious terror serve not only as tactics in a political struggle, but also as 
evocations of a much larger spiritual confrontation. Thus, religious terrorists 
aim for maximum causalities and are willing to use weapons of mass destruction 
(Gunning and Jackson 2011). As Magnus Ranstorp (1996:54) puts it, they are 
‘relatively unconstrained in the lethality and the indiscriminate nature of 
violence used’ because they lack ‘any moral constraints in the use of violence’. 
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Similarly, Jessica Stern (2003:xxii) argues that ‘[r]eligious terrorist groups are 
more violent than their secular counterparts and are probably more likely to use 
weapons of mass destruction’.
Thirdly, it is argued that religious terrorists have the capacity to evoke total 
commitment and fanaticism from their members; they are characterised by 
the suspension of doubt and an end-justifies-the-means view of the world – in 
contrast to the supposedly more measured attitudes of secular groups (Gunning 
and Jackson 2011). Juergensmeyer (2003:220) argues that ‘these disturbing 
displays have been accompanied by strong claims of moral justification and an 
enduring absolutism, characterised by the intensity of the religious activists’ 
commitment’. Moreover, it is suggested that in some cases the certainties of the 
religious viewpoint and the promises of the next world are primary motivating 
factors in driving insecure, alienated and marginalised youths to join religious 
terrorist groups as a means of psychological empowerment. As Juergensmeyer 
(2003:187) argues, ‘[t]he idea of cosmic war is compelling to religious activists 
because it ennobles and exalts those who consider themselves a part of it ... it 
provides escape from humiliation and impossible predicaments .... They become 
involved in terrorism ... to provide themselves with a sense of power’. It is further 
argued that such impressionable, alienated and disempowered young people are 
vulnerable to forms of brainwashing and undue influence by recruiters, extremist 
preachers or radical materials on the internet (Hoffman 2006:197–228, 288–290; 
Agbiboa 2013b). Romero (2007:445), for example, argues that Islamist terrorist 
connections can provide ‘social backing, meaning to life (to compensate for the 
spiritual emptiness felt), and a social or collective identity mainly based on the 
pride of forming part of the jihad as the only way of reaching the power and 
glory of Islam’.
It is important to note that the seismic rise of radical Islamist terrorism starting 
in the 1980s and 1990s has significantly contributed to the frequency and 
lethality of attacks perpetrated by religious terrorist groups (Rapoport 1998; 
Juergensmeyer 1997; Agbiboa 2013a). Available empirical data show that over the 
period 1968 to 2005, Islamist groups (especially groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb) were responsible for 93.6 percent of all terrorist attacks 
and 86.9 percent of all casualties inflicted by religiously-oriented terrorist 
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groups (Terrorism Knowledge Base, cited in Piazza, 2009:66). Piazza (2009:66) 
explains the higher frequency and intensity of terrorist activity among Islamists 
in the light of the (mis)interpretation of certain doctrines and practices within 
Islam, including the concept of ‘lesser jihad,’ the practice of militant struggle to 
defend Islam from its perceived enemies, or the Muslim reverence for ‘Itishhad’ 
(the practice of martyrdom). 
Piazza also shows how Al-Qaeda type groups fit a typology defined as 
‘universal/abstract’ while other Islamist terrorist groups are more properly 
categorised as ‘strategic’ (Piazza 2009:65). For Piazza, ‘the primary difference 
between universal/abstract groups and strategic groups is that the former are 
distinguished by highly ambitious, abstract, complex, and nebulous goals that 
are driven primarily by ideology … in contrast, strategic groups have much 
limited and discrete goals: the liberation of specific territory, the creation of an 
independent homeland for a specific ethnic group, or the overthrow of a specific 
government’ (Piazza 2009:65). According to this perspective, extremist Islamist 
groups like Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and Ansaru, among others, fall 
into the universal/abstract category on account of their global jihadist appeal, 
their absolutist and inflexible objectives, and their rigid ideological stance 
against outposts of the West and perceived enemies of Islam. 
Before examining the religious terrorism of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, 
it is expedient to provide a brief analysis of historical antecedents in northern 
Nigeria that may shed some light on the ongoing religious terrorism of 
Boko Haram. 
Northern Nigeria and the Maitatsine uprisings
Following independence, the first major experience of organised religious 
militancy in northern Nigeria came with the Maitatsine uprisings, which some 
scholars have connected to the jihad of Usman Dan Fodio in the 19th century. 
Usman Dan Fodio’s jihad established the powerful Sokoto Caliphate (1804–
1903) under the supreme law of Sharia (Hickey 1984; Adesoji 2011; Maiangwa 
2014). The Maitatsine movement was formed by an Islamic preacher called 
Muhammadu Marwa (nicknamed ‘Maitatsine’– that is, ‘the one who curses’). 
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Marwa migrated from Cameroon to northern Nigeria in 1945 (Pham 2012:2). 
Maitatsine polemics against Islamic authorities in Kano state were condemned 
by the British colonial authorities, who found him an extremist preacher. In 
Kano, Marwa became an Islamic zealot preoccupied with the purification 
of Islam. He believed that Islam had come under the corrupting influence of 
modernisation (Westernisation) (Danjibo 2009:6; Falola 1998:146). 
Marwa attracted the urban poor in the northern city of Kano with his message 
that ‘denounced the affluent elites as infidels, opposed Western influence, and 
refused to recognize secular authorities’ (HRW 2012:22). Some of the poor and 
marginalised population of northern Nigeria – the talakawa (‘commoners’)– 
were attracted to Maitatsine because ‘he condemned the hypocrisy and 
ostentation of the nouveau riche and promised redemption and salvation to 
God’s righteous people’ (Hickey 1984:253). The Maitatsine uprisings led to 
eleven days of violent clashes with state security forces in Kano in December 
1980. A tribunal of inquiry established by the federal government in 1981 found 
that 4 177 people were killed in the violence, excluding members of the police 
force who lost their lives trying to rein in the excesses of the sect. Nevertheless, 
state security forces were implicated in extrajudicial killings and arbitrary 
torture of Maitatsine members in their custody (HRW 2012; Agbiboa 2013a). 
Although the Nigerian military crushed the uprisings and killed its leader, the 
following five years (1981–85) witnessed the deaths of hundreds of people in 
reprisal attacks between remnants of the radical movement in the north and 
state security forces. Commenting on the issue, Falola (1998:138) regarded the 
Maitatsine uprisings in Kano and neighbouring areas of northern Nigeria in 
the 1980s as the first public religious violence in post-colonial Nigeria. Perhaps, 
it is also the first religious violence in Nigeria that, in all practical terms, 
demonstrates how religious ideology could link extremist groups from two 
different countries since, as mentioned earlier, Marwa (the Maitatsine leader) 
was a Cameroonian national. 
The Maitatsine uprisings technically ended in the 1980s. However, spates of 
violent religious activism saturated northern Nigeria from the 1990s onward. 
The emergence of Boko Haram, since its first violent uprising in 2009, represents 
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yet another violent form and phase of religious radicalism in northern Nigeria 
(Forest 2012). But who and what is Boko Haram?
The religious terrorism of Boko Haram
Boko Haram (a nomenclature which means ‘western education is sinful’) 
officially calls itself Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad, which 
translates as ‘People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation 
and Jihad’ (American Foreign Policy Council 2013:1). It is widely claimed that 
the group has been in existence since 2002. However, Boko Haram became 
the cynosure of public eyes in 2009, when it propagated the sectarian violence 
that primarily engulfed Bauchi and Maiduguri, killing over 1 000 people, 
including its initial leader Mohammed Yusuf. Yusuf was reportedly killed by the 
Nigerian police while in custody (Paris Model United Nations 2012:4). Besides 
ushering in another ‘phase of security forces ruthlessness in Nigeria’ (Bamidele 
2012:35), the death of Yusuf in police custody and the failure of the Nigerian 
government to prosecute those security personnel that were responsible for the 
extrajudicial killing of the Boko Haram leader, have been cited as one of the 
major reasons behind the ultra-radical turn of Boko Haram (Maiangwa and 
Uzodike 2012:3). At the end of the July 2009 uprising, the remaining members 
of the group reportedly fled to neighbouring countries, ‘where they attracted the 
attention of global jihadist movements based around the Sahel’ (Walker 2012:4). 
The UN Security Council reports that Boko Haram members received training 
in a Tuareg rebel camp in Mali during the group’s hibernation (Thurston 2011). 
In mid-2010, Boko Haram resurfaced in Maiduguri and started an unprecedented 
campaign of assassinations and suicide bombings, which, combined with its 
ideological appeal, have continued to smoulder. Some observers claim that 
the ‘speed at which the group developed the capability to produce large and 
effective improvised explosive devices and enlist suicide bombers to deliver them 
suggests outside help’ (Walker 2012:2). The group has so far waged audacious 
attacks on an array of public places including police stations, prisons, schools, 
places of worship, media houses, and the United Nations Headquarters in Abuja 
(Agbiboa 2013c; Forest 2012). The attack on the Nigerian police headquarters 
in Abuja by Boko Haram is believed to be the first suicide attack in Nigeria 
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(Maiangwa et al. 2012:48). For the rest of 2010, ‘the group attacked many 
police and state officials in Borno and Bauchi states, and extended its reign of 
terror to anyone – particularly Islamic clerics and traditional rulers – perceived 
to be in cahoots with the secular Nigerian government’ (Maiangwa 2013:96). 
Some other prominent attacks waged by the sect in 2011 and 2012 include the 
Madalla Christmas Day 2011 bombing that killed over 45 people, and the 20 
January 2012 coordinated attacks on three government establishments in Kano 
state, where over 185 people were reported dead (Maiangwa 2013:96). 
As the name suggests, Boko Haram is strongly opposed to what it sees as a 
Western-based incursion that threatens traditional values, beliefs, and customs 
among Muslim communities in northern Nigeria. The group’s first leader, 
Mohammed Yusuf, told the BBC in 2009: ‘Western-style education is mixed with 
issues that run contrary to our beliefs in Islam’ (BBC News 2009). Elsewhere, 
the charismatic leader noted: ‘Our land was an Islamic state before the colonial 
masters turned it to a kafir (infidel) land. The current system is contrary to 
true Islamic beliefs’ (Daily Trust 27 July 2009). It also appears that Boko Haram 
leaders have been linking their jihad in Nigeria with the global jihad being fought 
by foreign terrorist organisations like Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Al-Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). On 24 November 2011, a spokesman for Boko 
Haram, Abul Qaqa, stated: ‘It is true that we have links with Al-Qaeda. They 
assist us and we assist them’ (Chothia 2011). On one occasion, Boko Haram 
claimed that some of its members have been sent to Somalia to learn the acts 
of suicide bombing and destabilisation (Thurston 2011). A spokesperson 
of the group is reported to have stated that ‘very soon, we will wage jihad …. 
We want to make it known that our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia 
where they received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that 
country ungovernable .... This time round, our attacks will be fiercer and wider 
than they have been’ (cited in Maiangwa et al. 2012:48). Zenn (2013) claims that 
the suicide bomber that attacked the UN headquarters on 26 August 2011 in 
Abuja was a Cameroonian man called Mamman Nur, who reportedly travelled 
to Somalia to receive explosives training from Al-Shabaab before returning to 
Nigeria to execute the attack. 
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The foregoing suggests that Boko Haram may be joining forces with other 
jihadist groups in Africa for a variety of reasons: for training, for refuge, for 
financial support, and most importantly, for the fact that most of these jihadist 
groups are united by their strong religious ideology – a key feature of Piazza’s 
universal/abstract groups. The last factor (spiritual ideology) played out during 
the 2012 Malian crisis when Boko Haram’s splinter group, Ansaru,  which means 
‘Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa’ (Vanguard 2 February 
2012), killed two Mali-bound Nigerian troops in Kogi on 19 January 2013. 
The group justified this attack as ‘retaliation for the French-led intervention 
in Mali and “Western atrocities” in Afghanistan’ (Zenn 2014:26). In February 
2013, Ansaru1 also kidnapped seven foreign workers in north-eastern Nigeria 
and executed them, blaming the deaths on a joint Nigerian-British military 
operation intended to free the hostages (CNN 9 March 2013). The Nigerian 
media has also attributed to the splinter group the murder of four Chinese 
nationals, three Indians, and a Ghanaian in Borno, as well as the kidnapping, 
in May 2011, of two Europeans in an Italian construction company in Kebbi 
state who were killed in a botched rescue attempt in 2012 (Council on Foreign 
Relations 2012). 
According to Johnnie Carson, the assistant secretary of state in the Bureau 
of African Affairs, ‘Boko Haram is composed of at least two organisations, a 
larger organisation focused primarily on discrediting the Nigerian government, 
and a smaller more dangerous group that is increasingly sophisticated and 
increasingly lethal’ (IRIN 16 July 2012). In a recent report on insurgency of Boko 
Haram in Nigeria, the International Crisis Group (ICG 2014:38) claims that 
the group could even be composed of six factions. And that it is this fractious 
nature of the group that has made the possibility of a modus vivendi with Boko 
Haram difficult.
1 Ansaru emerged as a splinter sect of Boko Haram given its displeasure with the latter’s 
style of operations, and killings of innocent civilians, which it described as inhuman to the 
Muslim community. Hence, it vowed to restore dignity and sanity to ‘the lost dignity of 
Muslims in black Africa’ and to bring back the dignity of Islam in Nigeria and the Sokoto 
Caliphate, founded by Usman Dan Fodio in the late eighteenth century (Vanguard 2 
February 2012).
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Where does Boko Haram derive its funding from? In the past, the Nigerian 
authorities have been criticised for being unable to trace much of the funding that 
the group receives. However, in February 2012, recently arrested Boko Haram 
officials revealed that while the organisation initially relied on donations from 
members, its links with Al-Qaeda opened it up to more funding from groups 
in Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom (Agbiboa 2013d). Furthermore, the 
arrested officials divulged that other sources of funding included the Al Muntada 
Trust Fund and the Islamic World Society. A spokesman of Boko Haram also 
alleged that Kano State Governor Ibrahim Shekarau and Bauchi State Governor 
Isa Yuguda had placed them on a monthly salary (Agbiboa 2013d). Quite 
aside, Boko Haram is reportedly robbing local banks and demanding money 
from local traders in the north-east of Nigeria in order to finance its activities. 
On 10 December 2011, Mohammed Abdullahi, Central Bank of Nigeria 
spokesman, claimed that ‘at least 30 bank attacks attributed to Boko Haram 
were reported in 2011’ (Onu and Muhammed 2011). Beyond bank robberies 
and individual financiers, there have also been rumours of Boko Haram’s 
involvement in trafficking illicit weapons and kidnapping expatriates and 
tourists for ransom (Agbiboa 2013a). On 13 November 2013, Boko Haram 
kidnapped a French priest, Georges Vandenbeusch, in Nguetchewe parish of 
Moyo-Moskota in Cameroon. However, the priest was freed on 31 December, 
reportedly ‘after Boko Haram received payment of a ransom and the release of 
one of its prominent leaders imprisoned in Maroua, Cameroon’ (ICG 2014:18). 
Also, many in the south believe Boko Haram is being sponsored by powerful 
northern politicians whose aim is to pressure the Jonathan administration into 
abandoning any plans Jonathan may harbour of extending his term in office 
beyond 2015 (IRIN 16 July 2012). Ishiekwene, however, argues that ‘it’s nonsense 
to suggest that these politicians, whoever they are, would kill their kith and kin – 
and abduct their daughters on a mass scale – to prevent Jonathan from returning 
to power’ (Foreign Policy 6 May 2014).
Why Boko Haram rebels
The extent of relative poverty and inequality in the north has led several analysts and 
organisations to argue that socio-economic deprivation is the main factor behind 
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Boko Haram’s campaign of violence in northern Nigeria (OECD 2013; Mustapha 
2012; Kukah 2012; Agbiboa and Maiangwa 2013; HRW 2012). Kwaja (2011:1), for 
example, argues that ‘religious dimensions of the conflict have been misconstrued 
as the primary driver of violence when, in fact, disenfranchisement and inequality 
are the root causes’ (see also Mustapha 2012; Kukah 2012). Explanations such as 
these are often informed by the human needs theory of social conflicts which holds 
that all human beings have basic needs which they seek to fulfil, and that failure 
to meet these needs could lead to the outbreak of violent conflict (Rosati et al. 
1990). However, the link between socio-economic deprivation and the outbreak of 
conflict has been criticised as simplistic (Agbiboa 2013a). This is largely because it 
fails to explain why some poor people or places do not participate in violence, and 
because it offers very little in the way of clear recommendation for policy-makers 
(Agbiboa 2013a). In their work entitled ‘What causes terrorism?’ Krieger and 
Meierrieks (2011) examine a host of possible influences on terrorism, including, 
inter alia, global order, contagion, modernisation, institutional order and identity 
conflict. Following a detailed review of the relevant empirical literature on what 
causes terrorism, they concluded that ‘there is only limited evidence to support 
the hypothesis that economic deprivation causes terrorism ... poor economic 
conditions matter less to terrorism once it is controlled for institutional and 
political factors’ (Krieger and Meierrieks 2011:3). Instead, they argue that ‘terrorism 
is closely linked to political instability, sharp divides within the populace, country 
size and further demographic, institutional and international factors’ (Krieger and 
Meierrieks 2011:3). 
However, although militant Islam is the religious ideology that drives groups like 
Boko Haram, the relative deprivation theory cannot be simply wished away in the 
Boko Haram narrative. To begin with, northern Nigeria, especially the north-east, 
presents an ample example of impoverishment as demonstrated by widespread 
poverty, unemployment, infrastructural decay, and environmental stress. All these 
factors, while not directly the cause of the Boko Haram terrorism, nonetheless goad 
foot soldiers and foster a permissive environment for Boko Haram’s operations. 
Despite Nigeria’s economic growth in recent times, poverty and income inequality 
are high in the country. The International Crisis Group (2014:3) reports that 
112.5 million Nigerians (70 percent of the population) are classified as ‘poor and 
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absolutely poor’. The north-east, Boko Haram’s operational centre, ‘has the worst 
poverty rate of the six official zones’ (ICG 2014:3; see also Tables 1 and 2). This is 
compounded by the issue of illiteracy and climate change. Education in the north 
is poorly funded and even so, secular schools are scarce in the north-east of the 
country. And because many children are sent to Quranic schools where they often 
beg for alms on the streets; in the context of widespread poverty and social decay, 
this practice is open to abuse by groups like Boko Haram (ICG 2014:4).

















0.573 0.471 0.523 0.490 0.332 0.420
Source: UNDP (2009:10), cited in Agbiboa (2013a:77).
Table 2. Trends in poverty rates by zone for two relative poverty lines
Zone Core Poor Moderately Poor 
1996 2004 1996 2004 
*South South 23.4 17.0 34.8 18.1 
*South East 18.2 7.8 35.3 19.0 
*South West 27.5 18.9 33.4 24.2 
*North Central 28.0 29.8 36.7 37.2 
*North East 34.4 27.9 35.7 44.3 
*North West 37.3 26.8 39.9 44.4 
Source: Nigeria, National Bureau of Statistics (2010), cited in Agbiboa (2013a:77)
*South South: Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Edo and Delta
*South East: Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, Adamawa and Imo
*South West: Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo
*North Central: Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau and Abuja
*North East: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe
*North West: Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara
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What matters in the context of relative deprivation is how individuals feel about 
their position in the society. For instance, Moghaddam (2006:22) argues that ‘a 
Muslim might feel deprived because of the position of Muslims vis-à-vis other 
groups’. What is important to note here is that the feeling of deprivation in 
this sense is not merely restricted to the absence of material goods. It could be 
egoistical, fraternal and historical. According to Moghaddam (2006:47), feelings 
of relative deprivation in the Islamic world can be considered ‘in the historical 
context of the Near and Middle East’. This leads us to another noticeable 
characteristic of the Boko Haram phenomenon: its religiosity, which has largely 
been woven into its fabric by historical processes of religious politicisation 
in Nigeria’ (Maiangwa 2014:58). In addition, the Iranian revolution of 1979 
adds another dimension to militant Islam in Nigeria. The Iranian revolution 
encouraged some millenarian Islamic movements in Nigeria to fully assert 
themselves and demand good governance and a corruption-free society through 
Sharia law. It is interesting to note that the Maitatsine movement became rife 
in northern Nigeria during this period. This is in addition to the rise of other 
forms of Islamic revivalism and activism in northern Nigeria in the 1970s and 
the 1980s. In particular, the Jama’at Izalat al-Bida wa Iqamat al-Sunnah (Society 
for the Eradication of Evil Innovations and the Reestablishment of the Sunna), 
better known as the Izala Movement, has contributed to a ‘general religious 
revival and a much greater public and political role for Islam’ (ICG 2014:8) 
in northern Nigeria. Thus, it could be argued then, that Boko Haram’s call for 
social, political, and economic justice through the Sharia ‘reflects another form 
of violent religious activism which draws its authority from the lineage of the 
Islamic jihad of Dan Fodio and the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate’ 
(Lewis 2002:4, cited in Maiangwa 2014:64), as well as from the revivalist call 
for the institutionalisation of theocratic states by certain members of the 
globalised Islamic community in protest to what they regard as an imperialist 
world order. Given the foregoing, militant Islamism and relative deprivation 
are crucial factors to consider in understanding why an extremist Islamic group 
like Boko Haram rebels. However, we also argue that the ultra-violent turn of 
Boko Haram since it started employing sophisticated weapons and carrying out 
devastating attacks in 2010, owes largely to the manner in which the crisis has 
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been (mis-)managed by the Nigerian state. Thus, factors like the extrajudicial 
killing of Boko Haram initial leader Muhammed Yusuf, and the arbitrary 
arrest, torture and bloodletting of its members by state security forces have 
coalesced to incubate and sustain the group’s violent attacks. In addition, Boko 
Haram’s own suspicion of the authorities’ intent to resolve the crisis also fuels 
the insurgency of the group (ICG 2014:36). 
Given the foregoing, it is not surprising that Boko Haram remained adamant that 
it will not negotiate with the Nigerian state. Instead, the group has intensified 
its attacks on the Nigerian security officials and public establishments. Since 
the resumption of Boko Haram attacks in 2010, the group has raided over 60 
police facilities in at least 10 northern and central states, and Abuja, and killed 
at least 211 police officers. Between January and September 2012, 119 police 
officers lost their lives in suspected Boko Haram attacks – more than in all 
of 2010 and 2011 combined (Agbiboa 2013a). Boko Haram attacks have also 
increasingly targeted schools in northern Nigeria. In March 2013, approximately 
85 secondary schools were closed and over 120 000 pupils were sent home by 
the Borno state government following attacks on schools by Boko Haram. On 
14 April 2014 more than 200 female pupils were abducted when Boko Haram 
gunmen stormed a boarding school in Chibok, Borno state (Agbiboa 2014c).
The ‘flip-flop’ response of the Nigerian state
Two major approaches may be identified through which the Nigerian 
government has attempted to halt what the Human Rights Watch (2012) 
regards as the ‘spiralling violence’ of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. These 
may be described as the carrot and stick approaches.
The carrot approach involves political negotiation with all stakeholders in 
the Boko Haram conflict. In this regard, the Nigerian state, under the late 
President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, established a committee of inquiry led by 
Ambassador Usman Galtimari to ‘identify the grievances of the sect and make 
possible recommendations on how to improve security in the north-east 
region’ (Onuoha 2012). At the state level, the carrot approach has involved 
overtures and rapprochements to Boko Haram insurgents. For example, 
79
Religious terrorism, Boko Haram, and the dynamics of state response
former governor of Borno State Ali Modu Sheriff allegedly paid the sum of 
N100 million to mollify the anger of the group when their leader was killed in 
2009. The current governor, Kashim Shettima, called on Boko Haram to come 
forward for dialogue on 16 July 2011 (Aghedo and Osumah 2012:866). Since 
August 2011, the government has undertaken ‘back-channel’ talks with Boko 
Haram according to recommendations made by a panel charged with the task 
of bringing the group to the negotiating table and providing the option of an 
amnesty for those who are willing to reject violence and embrace peace talks. 
On 16 September 2011, former president Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007) 
held talks with some Boko Haram members in their birthplace and stronghold, 
the north-eastern city of Maiduguri, where they tabled demands for a ceasefire 
which included an end to arrests and killings of their members, payments of 
compensation to families of sect members killed by security personnel, and 
prosecution of policemen responsible for the killing of the group’s initial 
leader (Agbiboa 2013b). These demands were submitted to President Jonathan 
who promised to look into them. In 2012, Datti Ahmad, president of the 
National Supreme Council on Sharia, who is believed to have the respect of 
Boko Haram’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf, attempted to reach out to the 
group. Unfortunately, contact was broken by Boko Haram, who accused the 
Nigerian government of acting in bad faith, after the media gained access to the 
deliberations. Boko Haram responded to fresh reports of another initiative in 
early June 2012 by advising the prospective interlocutor, Islamic scholar Dahiru 
Usman Bauchi, to ‘steer clear’ (IRIN 16 July 2012). In August 2012, 58 percent 
of Nigerians supported dialogue with Boko Haram, according to a survey by 
the CLEEN Foundation (originally known as the Centre for Law Enforcement 
Education) and the Alliance for Credible Elections. In the predominantly 
Muslim north, where Boko Haram has been most active, there is an almost 
universal demand for dialogue, while in the south the prevailing attitude is that 
there can be no negotiation with ‘terrorists’ until they end the insurgency that 
has killed thousands of innocent people. But with the continued attacks on 
churches in the north, tolerance is fast evaporating across the mainly Christian 
south, even though a considerable number of Boko Haram’s victims have been 
fellow Muslims (IRIN 16 July 2012). 
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In the most recent attempt to negotiate with key leaders of Boko Haram, the 
Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan established a 26-member amnesty 
‘Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in 
the North’ (henceforth, the Committee). The Committee, headed by Nigerian 
Special Duties Minister Kabiru Tanimu, was given a three-month mandate to 
try to convince Boko Haram to lay down its arms in exchange for a state pardon 
and social integration (Thurston 2013). According to a released presidential 
statement, the Committee ‘has been given the task of identifying and 
constructively engaging key leaders of Boko Haram, and developing a workable 
framework for amnesty and disarmament of members of the group’ (Thurston 
2013). The Committee was made up of former and current government officials, 
religious authorities and human rights activists. However, Boko Haram’s 
supreme leader, Abubakar Shekau, has responded to the amnesty entreaties of 
the Nigerian government by saying that his group has not committed any wrong, 
and that an amnesty would not be applicable to them. Shekau argued instead 
that it was the Nigerian government committing atrocities against Muslims. In 
his words: ‘Surprisingly, the Nigerian government is talking about granting us 
amnesty. What wrong have we done? On the contrary, it is we that should grant 
you [a] pardon’. In a video released on 13 May 2013, Shekau vowed not to stop 
his group’s violent campaigns to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria under a 
strict form of Sharia law (Agbiboa 2013a). True to his threat, less than a week 
after Boko Haram rejected Nigeria’s amnesty offer, the jihadist group claimed 
responsibility for two back-to-back violent attacks in northern Nigeria. In the 
first attack, Boko Haram members disguised in Nigerian military uniforms, 
in buses and machine gun-mouthed trucks, laid siege to the town of Bama, in 
Borno State, killing 55, mostly police and security forces, and freeing over 100 
prison inmates. Days later, Boko Haram members killed 53 people and burnt 
down 13 villages in Nigeria’s Benue state (Agbiboa 2013c). 
In the wake of the recent violent attacks of Boko Haram, the Nigerian President 
Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in an attempt to restore order 
and reclaim control of the territories taken over by the sect in three northern 
states – Borno, Adamawa and Yobe – where Boko Haram has been most active 
(BBC News 2013a). This is not the first time the president has done this. 
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In December 2011, following spates of Boko Haram attacks, President Jonathan 
declared a state of emergency in 15 local government areas of six northern 
states. In a pre-recorded address to the Nigerian public on 14 May 2013, 
President Goodluck Jonathan openly declared that ‘[w]hat we are facing is not 
just militancy or criminality, but a rebellion and insurgency by terrorist groups 
which pose a very serious threat to national unity and territorial integrity’ 
(BBC News 2013a). Jonathan further stated that ‘it would appear that there is 
a systematic effort by insurgents and terrorists to destabilize the Nigerian state 
and test our collective resolve’ (BBC News 2013a). The president’s speech clearly 
underscored the seriousness and unprecedented nature of the Boko Haram 
crisis, at one point describing how Boko Haram fighters had taken control 
of state buildings and ‘had taken women and children as hostage’ (Agbiboa 
2013a:66). According to Jonathan, ‘these actions amount to a declaration of 
war and a deliberate attempt to undermine the authority of the Nigerian state 
and threaten (its) territorial integrity. As a responsible government, we will not 
tolerate this’ (Fox News 14 May 2013). Jonathan vowed to ‘take all necessary 
action ... to put an end to the impunity of insurgents and terrorists’, including 
the arrest and detention of suspects, the taking over of Boko Haram hideouts, 
the lockdown of suspected Boko Haram enclaves, the conducting of raids, and 
the arrest of anyone possessing illegal weapons (IRIN 22 May 2013). 
Thus, in 2012, President Goodluck Jonathan amended the Nigerian Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2011 and tasked the office of the National Security Adviser to 
conduct anti-terrorism operations (ICG 2014:30). Since this amendment was 
made, Boko Haram and its well-known splinter sect, Ansaru, have both been 
declared as terrorist organisations by the Nigerian government. The International 
Crisis Group (2014:30) reports that the Nigerian state is now prosecuting 
several Boko Haram suspects; although it is not exactly clear how the security 
forces acquired the evidence to arrest these suspected members of Boko Haram 
considering the well-documented problem of intelligence police data gathering 
and ‘its poor and inconsistent application’ (ICG 2014:33).
Whatever the practical merits of the modest attempts by the Nigerian 
government to negotiate with Boko Haram and strengthen its anti-terrorism 
laws, there is ample evidence that lends credence to the overwhelming 
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investment in the stick approach by the Nigerian state, involving the use of state 
security forces to ‘mount aggressive pursuit and crackdown of [Boko Haram] 
members’ (Onuoha 2012). To this end and intent, the Nigerian government 
established a special Joint Military Task Force (JTF), known as ‘Operation 
Restore Order’ to crush the Boko Haram group. The JTF are supplemented 
by the Civilian JTF (CJTF) and a small contingent of Chadian and Nigerien 
forces who were members of a ‘Joint Multinational Task Force (JMTF) 
initially created to combat smuggling’ (ICG 2014:34). The establishment of 
these forces have to some extent destabilised the operational capabilities of 
Boko Haram ‘to conduct coordinated bombings like the ones it carried out 
in major urban cities in 2011 and 2012’ (ICG 2014:35). However, the effort is 
yet to blunt the sect’s attacks. This is despite the unprecedented defence and 
security vote of US$6 billion for 2012, collaboration with Western security 
forces, and the closure of Nigeria’s borders with its northern neighbours 
(Al Jazeera 2013b). In the biggest campaign to date against Boko Haram, 
the Nigerian president ordered some 8 000 soldiers to the troubled northern 
region in a direct military offensive against Boko Haram fighters (BBC News 
2013b). In less than three days into the military operation, the JTF recorded 
its first achievement, announcing that it had rescued nine women and 
children held hostage by Boko Haram during a recent crackdown on one of 
the group’s major hideouts (Sahara Reporters 2013). A curfew was imposed 
on Maiduguri as the JTF used air strikes to target Boko Haram strongholds. 
The Nigerian government also imposed a blockade on the group’s traditional 
base of Maiduguri in Borno State in order to re-establish Nigeria’s ‘territorial 
integrity’ (Al Jazeera 2013a). 
However, far too often, members of the JTF and the State Security Services 
(SSS) have been accused of killing innocent people in the name of countering 
terrorism in northern Nigeria. In Borno State, for example, JTF members have 
allegedly resorted to extra-legal killings, dragnet arrests and intimidation of the 
hapless Borno residents (Agbiboa 2013a). As noted by Hussein (2012:9), ‘far 
from conducting intelligence-driven operations, the JTF simply cordoned off 
areas and carried out house-to-house searches, at times shooting young men in 
these homes’. In Maiduguri, ‘The security agents increasingly see members of 
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the society as siding with the group’ (Hussein 2012:9). Drawing on its interviews 
with residents at Maiduguri, Human Rights Watch reports that: ‘during raids 
into communities soldiers have set fire to houses, shops, and cars, randomly 
arrested men from the neighbourhood, and in some cases executed them in 
front of their shops or houses’ (HRW 2012:60). Furthermore, ‘government 
security agencies routinely hold suspects incommunicado without charge or 
trial in secret detention facilities and have subjected detainees to torture or 
other physical abuse’ (HRW 2012:58). 
In a recent crossfire between members of the JTF and Boko Haram in Baga, a 
village on Lake Chad near Nigeria’s border with Cameroon, up to 187 people 
were killed and 77 others injured. But Baga residents have accused the JTF, not 
Boko Haram, of firing indiscriminately at civilians and setting fire to much of 
the historically fishing town (Atlanta Blackstar 23 April 2013). The Nigerian 
authorities have rarely brought any security forces to justice for these alleged 
large-scale crimes against civilians (HRW 2012). Although the Nigerian police 
have denied the allegations of brutality against civilians, it must be noted that 
Nigeria’s armed forces have an unenviable history of terrorising ‘ordinary’ 
Nigerians. As Alemika (1988:161) argues, the legacy of the Nigerian armed 
forces is that of ‘arbitrariness, ruthlessness, brutality, vandalism, incivility, low 
accountability to the public and corruption’. The same verdict may be passed on 
the Nigerian state itself, as the late Professor Ake (1992:16) notes: ‘More often 
than not, the post-colonial state in Nigeria presented itself as an apparatus of 
violence, and while its base in social forces remained extremely narrow, it relied 
unduly on coercion for compliance, rather than authority’.
Relentless attacks by Boko Haram, excessive use of force by the JTF and inter-
communal violence in northern Nigeria are currently creating a deadly cocktail 
that puts populations at heightened risk of crimes against humanity in Nigeria. 
As fighting intensifies between the JTF and Boko Haram, the indiscriminate 
use of force by both sides is contributing to a rising number of civilian 
deaths. Caught between what Mustapha (2012) describes as ‘Boko Haram and 
Government Haram’, civilians continue to face potential mass atrocity crimes. 
This is especially critical when we bear in mind that the JTF have been accused 
of targeting civilians and committing human rights violations. Already, the 
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United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has announced 
that over 6 200 refugees have arrived in Niger from northern Nigeria fearing 
retaliatory attacks and general insecurity as a result of an intensified state 
offensive against Boko Haram (Agbiboa 2014a). 
In the latest development, the JTF are enlisting untrained youths armed 
with machetes and sticks for their fight against Boko Haram. This pattern is 
increasingly evident across northern states, but especially in Maiduguri where 
the youth vigilante group – who call themselves the Civilian JTF – and the 
state JTF are tracking down Boko Haram members and preventing suspected 
members of the group from returning to the state capital from where they were 
forced out in a military crackdown in May 2013. The battle between Boko Haram 
and the Civilian JTF, comprised of some 500 youths, has had a chequered history 
with many youths needlessly killed. While the efforts of the Civilian JTF have 
been commended by the state political leadership, there are growing concerns 
that the Civilian JTF is a ‘brewing disaster’ which could transform into a new 
militia if their activities were not placed under strict regulation by the state 
(Olugbode 2013). 
The growing frustration of the Nigerian government with the deteriorating 
security situation in northern Nigeria has become increasingly evident in its ‘flip-
flop’ approach from dialogue about granting amnesty to Boko Haram members 
to the deployment of military troops and the proclamation of war against 
Boko Haram in less than a month (see Council on Foreign Relations 2012). 
The latter, coupled with President Jonathan’s declaration of a state of emergency 
in troubled parts of northern Nigeria, has added a further complication to 
the already Herculean task of the amnesty Committee and made it almost 
impossible to win the trust of senior Boko Haram leaders (Council on Foreign 
Relations 2012). The adoption of such contradictory strategies by the Nigerian 
state has stalled any prospect of a negotiated dialogue with Boko Haram. 
As one leading rights activist in the north, Shehu Sani, who has participated in 
past negotiations with Boko Haram, recently noted: ‘You can’t talk of peace on 
one hand and be deploying troops on the other’ (cited in IRIN 22 May 2013). 
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The questions currently facing the amnesty Committee are serious: How will 
the new Committee identify credible interlocutors? Can anyone speak for 
Boko Haram, particularly if it proves increasingly fragmented and prone to the 
emergence of splinter groups like Ansaru? If Boko Haram has already rejected 
amnesty, what conditions would induce a volte-face? Does Boko Haram have 
grievances and demands that an amnesty programme could feasibly address, 
as in the case of the oil conflict and struggle for survival in the Niger Delta? 
(Thurston 2013).2 Will the current state of emergency and efforts towards 
amnesty prove mutually reinforcing, constituting a ‘carrot and stick’ approach 
to Boko Haram, or does the state of emergency signal that the Nigerian 
government lacks a clear strategy (Thurston 2013)? The task of the amnesty 
Committee is also complicated by the fact that, as President Jonathan once 
argued: ‘Some [supporters and members of Boko Haram] are in the executive 
arm of government, some of them are in the parliamentary/legislative arm 
of government, while some of them are even in the judiciary. Some are also 
in the armed forces, the police and other security agencies’ (Agbiboa 2013a). 
However, Ishiekwene argues that ‘whether the country has been brought to its 
knees by the enemies within, or whether corruption and poor leadership have 
enfeebled the government’s response, it is frighteningly clear that this is now a 
war for the country’s very life’ (Foreign Policy 6 May 2014).
Appreciably, the carrot and stick approaches of the Nigerian government has 
polarised the Nigerian public into two groups: those who support the use of 
coercion on the one hand and supporters of conciliation on the other (Aghedo 
and Osumah 2012). Advocates of a coercive approach to tackling terrorism 
argue that force rather than dialogue is more effective in dealing with terrorist 
organisations. However, many others are overwhelmed by the threat of a 
possible civil war in a country of about 170 million people – Africa’s largest. 
These people contend that a coercive strategy would be ineffective in resolving 
2 While the amnesty deal in the Niger Delta allowed the state to buy off militant leaders 
to ensure maximum oil production, such a strategy might be impracticable with Boko 
Haram terrorists because of their narratives of grievance, which, as Aghedo and Osumah 
(2012:854) argue, are largely religiously driven and therefore less pecuniary than those of 
the Niger Delta militants, whose grievances were for a more equitable share of oil rents 
sourced from their homelands (see Thurston 2013). 
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the crisis because of ‘the relative incapacity of the state security apparatus’ and 
the fact that ‘Boko Haram rebels operate from among the people and target 
both government and ordinary citizens’ (Aghedo and Osumah 2012:854). These 
people suggest non-killing measures, including political dialogue and amnesty 
packages. Also, the carrot and stick approaches of the Nigerian government 
have generated mixed reactions from informed observers. Some argue that the 
Nigerian government was forced into taking a military action against Boko 
Haram. According to Mahmud, a famous constitutional lawyer in Nigeria, 
‘[n]o government anywhere will allow a group to usurp part of its territorial 
sovereignty. The declaration of a state of emergency was necessitated by the 
constitutional obligation to restore a portion of Nigeria’s territory taken over 
by an armed group which involves the suspension of constitutional provisions 
relating to civic rights’ (IRIN 22 May 2013). 
Other observers, however, worry that the stick response of the Nigerian 
government will force Boko Haram to shift their bases, with grave consequences 
for Nigeria and neighbouring countries. As Nigerian political scientist Kyari 
argues, ‘Boko Haram cannot face Nigerian troops in conventional war; the 
troop deployment to northern Borno means they will move out to other towns 
and cities with less military presence and launch guerrilla war, which is deadlier’ 
(IRIN 22 May 2013). 
While the current military crackdowns on Boko Haram has the potential to 
significantly degrade the group’s operational capability to mount large-scale 
and coordinated violent attacks, it must be considered that relying exclusively 
on such an approach may increasingly force ultra-radical elements within 
the group to network with global jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb and the Somali-based Al-Shabaab as a form of survival strategy. In 
the event of this happening, the group’s operational base could expand beyond 
northern Nigeria and their target selection could change fundamentally to 
include attacks on Western interests. Although the establishment of the amnesty 
Committee reflects President Goodluck Jonathan’s acknowledgment that 
purely military means cannot resolve the current impasse, it is also consistent 
with policymaking tendencies toward the extremist group that are ‘reactive, ad 
hoc, and cyclical’ (Thurston 2013). 
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Conclusion and recommendations
The current Boko Haram crisis poses the fiercest challenge to Nigeria’s unity 
since the end of the three-year Civil War in 1970. The International Crisis 
Group (2014:40) notes that the Boko Haram crisis has fractured Nigerians 
along religious lines and thus ‘reversed some of the country’s hard-won gains 
in building national unity and stability’. In addition, the generalised sense 
of insecurity and ubiquitous bomb scares has dealt a major blow to political 
and socio-economic activities in northern Nigeria. With the 2015 elections 
approaching, Boko Haram has remained unrelenting and as a result, local 
communities are growing increasingly apprehensive due to the frequent 
bombings, shootings, and arbitrary killings on the part of state security forces. 
Unfortunately, military crackdowns have failed to curb spiralling violence in 
northern Nigeria or to rein in Boko Haram’s violent attacks; on the contrary, it 
might have even strengthened Boko Haram’s resolve against the Nigerian state, 
while alienating the local community. In a recent video footage, Boko Haram’s 
leader, Abubakar Shekau, claimed that the ongoing military offensive against 
his group by the Nigerian forces is failing. In the video, Shekau called on his 
fellow brethren from Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Syria to join what he 
called Boko Haram’s jihad. He assured them that ‘we are strong, hale and hearty 
since they [the Nigerian forces] launched this assault on us following the state of 
emergency declaration’ (Al Jazeera 2013a). Shekau’s words cast serious doubts 
on the one-sided victory claims by the Nigerian security forces that the Boko 
Haram rebellion has been crushed (Agbiboa 2013a).
A significant aspect of the current campaign of violence in northern Nigeria is the 
rigidity of the Nigerian forces in dealing with Boko Haram. Admittedly, resolving 
the current crisis is not an easy task, but resorting to the unidirectional tactics 
of military crackdowns can only further complicate matters by militarising the 
polity and escalating violence. We argue that efforts must be made to understand 
which strategic choices would sustainably attend both to the underlying factors 
that make Nigeria vulnerable to terrorist threat and to the sustained grievances 
of Boko Haram. In other words, the failure of military force to reduce spiralling 
violence in northern Nigeria calls for a strategic rethink that must be open 
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to all the components that are conducive to violence. To this end, we make 
specific recommendations to the Nigerian state, the neighbouring states in the 
region (ECOWAS member states), the Nigerian people and religious leaders 
of the different convictions, but especially of Islam, and to the Boko Haram 
group itself. 
To the Nigerian state 
If Nigeria is to effectively respond to the current Boko Haram crisis, the following 
policy recommendations should be seriously considered by the Nigerian political 
leadership: 
(1) The Nigerian government should work towards winning the confidence 
of Boko Haram by implementing some of the demands the group members 
presented to the government, including the release and the payment of 
compensation to the families of those killed in the security crackdowns by the 
JTF. This will demonstrate to the Boko Haram members that the government is 
sincere about its willingness to hold dialogue with them. In addition, as the 2015 
election approaches, the northern governors and other public officials must strive 
to guard against any form of electoral violence or religious intolerance during 
this period. Already, there are widespread allegations from southern Nigeria that 
Boko Haram is the handiwork of northern leaders. If the 2015 elections turn 
violent in northern Nigeria as in 2011, the integrity and reputation of northern 
leaders will be severely tainted. 
(2) The Nigerian government must develop an effective counterterrorism 
policy that goes beyond a security-only killing approach in order to embed 
counterterrorism in an overarching national security strategy that appreciates 
the broader context in which Islamic radicalisation occurs. What Nigeria has 
lacked so far is a viable concept of strategic counterterrorism that will guide 
her actions, help undermine the recruitment of terrorists, and change the 
environment they inhabit into an increasingly non-violent and permissive one. 
The declaration, on 18 March 2014, by the National Security Adviser of the 
adoption of ‘soft approaches’ to counter Boko Haram is a progressive step in this 
direction (ICG 2014:42). The Nigerian state must demonstrate the willingness 
and consistency to implement these soft approaches in tackling the Boko Haram 
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crisis. This will entail, at least, the institutionalisation of counter-radicalisation 
programmes and civic education in schools, communities and religious houses; 
the provision of entrepreneurial opportunities for the countless jobless youth in 
northern Nigeria, and the entire country; and the establishment of counselling 
centres and social support services for extremists and detained terrorists or 
suspected terrorists. 
(3) There is a need for an intelligence-led strategy to better confront Boko 
Haram’s localised terrorist activities and its global aspirations. Added to this, 
there is a necessity for greater international cooperation in terms of identifying 
and intercepting Boko Haram’s growing external funding, weapon sources, and 
training which is crucial to the group’s operational capabilities. In this context, 
the Nigerian Police Force can benefit greatly from the work of the International 
Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) who have more sophisticated 
intelligence gathering equipment and experts on transnational crime in 
West Africa. Thus, the Nigerian state should organise an effective means of 
cooperating with INTERPOL in order to benefit from its operations, training, 
and equipment. 
(4) Since Boko Haram is infusing religion into a long-churning brew of grievances 
about corruption, injustice and unfair distribution of wealth and power, a long-
term strategy that will undercut the jihadist appeal in northern Nigeria must 
address the sources of socio-economic inequalities and human insecurity in the 
region – the poorest geopolitical zone in Nigeria in terms of socio-economic 
indices. In collaboration with the state and local governments, the federal 
government should undertake a grassroots socio-economic empowerment 
programme that is aimed at generating employment opportunities and 
promoting human security. In this regard, it is important to recall the words of 
Azar, that ‘conflict resolution can only occur and last if satisfactory amelioration 
of underdevelopment occurs as well ....’ (cited in Ramsbotham et al. 2008:86). 
Similarly, Schroder (2003:1) argues that ‘... to address the root causes of terrorism 
and insecurity ... we must ensure social and material but also cultural security’. 
In line with Azar and Schroder, we argue that non-killing policies that overcome 
economic and social insecurity or political instability are most likely to be 
effective in reducing the incentives for religious terrorism in northern Nigeria. 
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Some prominent Nigerians, including the former Central Bank Governor, 
Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, have pushed for the establishment of a federal ministry 
of northern development similar to the one established in the Niger Delta region 
(ICG 2014:42). Even if this ministry does not see the light of day, it is incumbent 
upon the Nigerian state to channel resources and demonstrate the will toward 
developing the largely dormant agricultural and other economic industries in 
northern Nigeria. 
(5) The use of military force as a counterterrorism strategy is frequently unwise 
because it is inevitably indiscriminate and often results in the alienation of 
exactly those individuals in northern Nigeria who we do not want radicalised. 
Moreover, military action against terrorist targets often causes the deaths 
of innocent civilians, no matter how much care is taken (Agbiboa 2013b). 
A military strategy does not only provide terrorists with critical experience in 
tactics, but forces them to create new networks of support as a form of survival 
strategy. A non-killing strategy that perseveres in political dialogue is likely to 
win the trust of the Boko Haram leadership which is crucial to bringing them to 
the negotiating table (Agbiboa and Maiangwa 2013).
To neighbouring states and ECOWAS 
Bearing in mind that the threat of Boko Haram is expanding into neighbouring 
countries, with recent attacks and kidnapping of foreigners by Boko Haram in 
Cameroon, we argue that regional efforts and collaboration in counterterrorism 
is essential in combating not just the terrorism of Boko Haram, but other 
terrorist franchises holding sway in West Africa and the entire Sahel Sahara axis. 
As it stands, the Nigerian state is currently struggling to combat the terrorism 
of Boko Haram, and its appreciable weakness in this capacity has also affected 
its contribution to the regional counterterrorism efforts under the auspices 
of ECOWAS. Along these lines, Nigeria will need the help of its neighbours, 
especially those with whom it shares contiguous borders, such as Niger, Chad, 
and Cameroon. Together, these countries can develop efficient intelligence-
sharing capability and provide well-trained security forces to police their porous 
borders against the influx of weapons, terrorist elements and drugs. In the 
long-run, ECOWAS will have to revitalise its Stand-by Force for this purpose. 
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But it can only do so with the support and commitment of its member states 
and, of course, the African Union and the United Nations. In addition to this 
regional effort, the International Crisis Group (2014:46) argues that Nigeria 
should urgently implement its policy of sending senior ambassadors and 
defence attachés to deliberate on security matters with other countries within 
the West African region. If successful, this can lead to strong bilateral security 
arrangements between Nigeria and her immediate neighbours who are also 
affected by the Boko Haram crisis. 
To the Nigerian people and religious leaders of the different convictions
There is an urgent need for religious leaders and followers of the different 
religious convictions in Nigeria to join together to publicly denounce all 
forms of religious intolerance and sectarian violence and encourage, especially 
through sermons, the need for religious harmony and tolerance of other faiths. 
In particular, dialogue between Christians and Muslims is vital because it will 
help clear the clouds of misunderstanding and create a better ambience of mutual 
enrichment. In addition, dialogue about action, communion and socio-political 
life should be promoted at all levels of society. These could include joint social 
projects, joint health projects and joint economic ventures that will facilitate 
community development and peaceful coexistence. All religious communities 
must understand that there is no alternative to inter-faith dialogue, as there can 
never be a universal religion or an exclusive society for adherents of a particular 
religion. The Nigerian state can encourage interfaith dialogue by establishing 
interfaith dialogue centres in various parts of the country, beginning from the 
north. The state governors can support this initiative by appointing renowned 
religious leaders from both the Christian and Islamic faiths to lead interfaith 
dialogue and programmes of mutual understanding in these centres (Maiangwa 
2013). Islamic religious leaders in northern Nigeria should also find a way of 
dismantling the textual universe of Salafist Islam on which the Boko Haram 
ideology hinges (Ulph 2013:72). Also, Christian and Muslim religious education 
should be tailored in such a way as to eschew the exclusive teaching of dogmatic 
Christian and Islamic doctrines and to foster mutual respect, tolerance and 
amity. It cannot be expected that the gains of such engagement will come any 
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time soon because it will require ‘massive investments in educational resources’ 
(Ulph 2013:72). However, if the process is delayed or not executed, there may be 
no end in sight to Islamic radicalism in northern Nigeria. 
To Boko Haram
Boko Haram also has a significant role to play in resolving some of its grievances. In 
this regard, we press further the view of the International Crisis Group (2014:47) 
that Boko Haram should ‘formulate clear minimalist conditions for ending the 
violence … the sect and its affiliates should explore with the government how 
to reach a rapprochement’. This will enable the Boko Haram group to continue 
with its tradition of helping the poor and the less privileged through acts of 
social work and charity, which are also notable works undertaken by some 
terrorist groups elsewhere like Hezbollah and Hamas (Moghaddam 2006:3). 
However, as already stated in the theoretical section of this paper, appeasing a 
religious terrorist group like Boko Haram will be a difficult endeavour, if not 
altogether an impossible task. This is particularly so due to what we alluded to 
as the poisoned worldview of universal/abstract religious terrorist groups who 
revel in jihad as the only solution to attaining their spiritual objectives (Byman 
2003:147). 
In the final analysis, if Boko Haram remains determined to Islamise Nigeria, 
the cycle of violence involving the group and the Nigerian state will persist with 
insidious consequences on the lives of ordinary civilians. In the long run, the 
Nigerian state may eventually win the war against the group. But as we have 
argued, this Pyrrhic victory will entirely depend on how the battle is fought. 
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